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( 1933

Pursuant to U. -..n. $ 63™,.... .
tncse statutes m i
rules governing agency action, agency review
and judicial
review that were m effect on December 31, 193"*, govern al
agency adjudicative proceedings commenced before an agency
or before December 31, : r?"7
"he hearing before the
Commission took place ::: June .--4 1987. Tr
Accordingly, all statutes and rules c*ted in tr. is m e : ar
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; toe convenience n:: toe Court Appendix A contains t:ne
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to U.C.A.
§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1983), U.C.A. § 59-1-602(3) (1986) [now
repealed, see n. 1, supra 1, and Rule 14, R. Utah S. Ct.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether Amax's magnesium manufacturing plant is

"appurtenant" to a mine within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-3
(1986) and therefore properly assessed by the State Tax
Commission, or whether Amax's plant is properly assessed by the
Tooele county assessor and therefore entitled to the 20%
reduction embodied in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 (1986).
2.

Whether, because the Commission's valuation of Amax's

property relied upon the same comparable sales and cost
approaches that would have been used by the Tooele county
assessor, the Commission's refusal to apply the provisions of
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 (1986) to Amax's real and tangible personal
property violates Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1) of the
Utah Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article XIII, Section 2(10) of the Utah Constitution provides
in pertinent part:
Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as
property or it may be taxed as property in such manner
and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but
if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also
be taxed.
Article XIII, Section 3(1) of the Utah Constitution provides
in pertinent part:

- 2 -

The Legislature shall provide by law a unitrr- a P j equal
rate of assessment on all tangible property m testate, according to its value in money, except as
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such
property, so that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its
tangible property,
Utah Code Ann

) 9 ] ] (1 9 8 6 ) p r o v i d e s

in p e r t i n e n t

D ;:I r t:

All tangible property in this state, not exempt unaer
the laws of the United States or under the Constitution
of this state, shall be taxed in proportion to its value
as hereinafter provided. Intangible property shall be
exempt from ad valorem assessment, levy and taxation
Utah Code Ann. §

•-

'

^^:^,.

_:

All taxable property, ncr, specifically exe~.pt una^r
Article XIII, Sec. :, of the Constitution of Utah must
be assessed at 20% of its reasonacie fair oasn * . .e
"-O-J^I-T-

:*

:~

.

;ert i ""*:=" *"

[A] 11
mines anc
. .^ ^ a . ; ^ u::i ~ne: v:_a:le
deposits, including . - , nonmetailiferc^s miner:- s
underlying land tr.e surface of vhicn is owned by a
person other than the owner of suon minerals, all
machinery used m mining and all property or surr'ics
improvements upon *r *pp.-: * ^nant to mines or mir.-.r.g
claims
e assessed by the state tix
commission . .
All taxable property net required by
the Constitution w r i-y *-* to be assessed by the state
tax commission must be assessed by the county assessor
of the several counties in which the same is situated.
For the purposes of taxation, all mills reduction
works, and smelters used exclusively ::r one purpose of
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine :r mining
claim by the owner thereof shall be deemed to be
appurtenant to such mine or mining cla:^ -hough the same
is not upon such mine ^- -miner claim
Utah Code Ann. § 5 9-5-4.5(1

• j; IP

r;

o ,-, !

111;:

When the county assessor uses ti le comparable sales or
oDst appraisal method in valuing taxable property for

assessment purposes, the assessor is required to
recognize that various fees, services, closing costs,
and other expenses related to the transaction lessen the
actual amount that may be received in the transaction.
The county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of the
value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the
property as its reasonable fair cash value for purposes
of assessment.
The full text of U.C.A. §§ 59-1-1, 59-5-1, 59-5-3 and
59-5-4.5 (1986), as well as the full text of the current codified
versions of these statutes, is set forth in Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature Of The Case
Amax seeks review of a final order of the Utah State Tax

Commission ("Commission") determining the 1986 assessed value of
its real and personal property located in Tooele County, Utah.
The Commission originally assessed the value of Amax's property
as of January 1, 1986 to be $84,332,150.

Pursuant to an informal

hearing held on August 25, 1986, the Commission reduced the
2
assessed value of the property to $78,312,895.
Amax thereafter
petitioned the Commission for a plenary formal hearing on the
proper market value of its properties.

That formal hearing took

place on June 3 and 4, 1987. Tr. 1, 227. The Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision of the Commission, which
further reduced the assessed value of the property by

2
This adjustment reflected the removal from the tax rolls
of certain personal property no longer owned by Amax, the
reduction to salvage value of certain items put in Amax's
"boneyard," and a correction of certain errors relating to
materials and supplies. Tr. 148. The propriety of this
adjustment is not disputed here.

approximately $5 million, were entered on December 21, 1987.
3
Docketing Statement, Appendix 2.
The Commission denied a
timely Petition For Reconsideration by a Decision and Order dated
May 31, 1988.

Docketing Statement, Appendix 1.

Amax filed a

timely petition for review with this Court on June 29, 1983.
Docketing Statement, Appendix 3.
II.

Statement Of Facts
This case involves the propriety of the Commission's

disregard of U.CA. § 59-5-4.5 (1986) in establishing the
4
1986 "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property.

The

Commission, after using comparable sales and cost approaches (Tr.
151-152, 155-156) and making the adjustments summarized in notes
2 and 3 above, set the 1986 "reasonable fair cash value" of
Amax's property at approximately $78,312,895.

In arriving at

this "reasonable fair cash value," however, the Commission
declined to apply U.CA. § 59-5-4.5, which requires county
assessors —

but not the Commission —

to "take 80% of the value

3
At the formal hearing, Amax argued that the Commission had
erroneously concluded that certain costs incurred in
maintaining Amax's dikes against the rapidly rising waters of
the Great Sale Lake were capital expenditures rather than
expenses. Tr. 96-99. These expenses did not add value to
Amax's holdings, but rather represented efforts to restore
and maintain the value of its property. Id. The Commission
held that these costs "are to be expensed and not added to
the value of the plant." Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at
5. The propriety of this reduction in the assessed value of
Amax's property is not contested here.
Utah C:;e Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986) (*[a]ll taxable property
. . . must oe assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash
value . . . " ) .

4
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based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property as
its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment."

The

Commission dismissed Amax's argument that, because its property
should have been assessed by the Tooele County assessor, Amax was
entitled to the statutory 20% discount.

The Commission also

rejected Amax's submission that, in light of the fact that the
Commission used the same comparable sales and cost methods tnat
would ~ave been used by the Tooele County assessor, the refusal
to calculate the "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property
under U.C.A- § 59-5-4.5 violated Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and
3(1) of the Utah Constitution.

Both of these conclusions are

erroneous.
A.

Description Of Amax's Property

Amax's property consists of (a) a facility for manufacturing
magnesium, comprised of personal property and improvements on
land owned by Amax (the "Plant") (Tr. 119-120, Exh. 2), and (b) a
series of evaporation ponds, comprised of earthen dikes and other
related equipment, located on land owned by various state and
federal agencies, the surface of which is leased by Amax (the
"Ponds").

Id.

The Plant:

The Plant is a large manufacturing facility,

covering almost a square mile of land, situated in the center of
approximately seven square miles of land owned in fee by Amax.
Exh. 2, Tr. 119. Through various chemical and electrical
processes, the Plant produces magnesium, a metal not found in a
natural state, from concentrated brine solutions.

- 6 -

Tr. 41-4 4.

The profitability of the Plant is determined by, among other
things, the availability of an adequate supply of concentrated
brine and the level of energy costs incurred in the manufacturing
5
process.

Id.

Although the Plant is currently the third

largest producer of magnesium in the free world (Tr. 140) ,
has had a troubled financial history.

The Plant, in fact, has

turned a profit only one year since its construction,
The Ponds:

it

Tr. 46.'

The Ponds consist of a series of earthen dikes,

together with related improvements, located on about 70 square
miles of state and federal land, the surface of which is leased
by Amax.

Tr. 39. The Ponds, located some 15 miles from the

Plant, are designed to slowly convert salt water from the Great
5
Production of magnesium is an energy intensive process.
Indeed, high electrical costs can be fatal to a magnesium
manufacturer's profitability. Tr. 41-44; Tr. 140 (magnesium
plant in Japan shut down as a result of high energy costs).
Because of this factor, the Plant was originally set for
construction in the State of Washington to take advantage of
low hydroelectric energy rates. Tr. 35. Under that plan,
powdered minerals from the Great Salt Lake would have been
shipped out of state for ultimate refining. Tr. 35-56.
Former Governor Calvin Rampton, however, persuaded Amax's
predecessor to locate the plant in Utah by assuring the
availability of a power rate comparable to the power rate in
Washington. Tr. 36-37.
6
A Dow Chemical plant in Freeport, Texas, and a Norske
Hydro plant in Norway are the two largest magnesium
producers. Tr. 140. To Amax's knowledge, only four other
magnesium plants — located in Canada, Yugoslavia, Brazil and
France — are currently in operation. Id.
7

Amax's predecessor, NL Industries, never showed a profit
from its operation of the Plant. Tr. 46. Amax, which
purchased the Plant from NL Industries, has lost over $45
million through 1986. Id. The Plant turned a modest profit
in 1984, due at least in part to the payment of a $4.7
million insurance claim. Id.

- 7 -

Salt Lake into concentrated brine over a seven-year evaporation
period.

Tr. 49, 137. The rising waters of the Great Salt Lake,

however, have wreaked havoc with the Ponds in recent years. In
May 1983, high waves resulting from a wind storm breached two
dikes, contaminating everything but the final concentration pond
with water from the lake.

Tr. 44, 48. Undiluted brine in the

final concentration pond permitted operation of the Plant through
1983, but after that date Amax was forced to purchase additional
brine from out-of-state suppliers.

Tr. 48-49.

Between 1983 and

1986, Amax spent over $33 million in an attempt to repair the
damage done in 1983 and prevent further degradation of the Ponds.
Tr. 45-46.

The effort was unavailing.

In June 1986, the dikes

were again breached, inundating the entire concentration system.
Tr. 51. As a result, all concentrated brine processed by Amax
since the 1986 breach has been purchased from third-party
suppliers and transported to the Plant.
B.

Tr. 45, 49.

The Commission's Valuation

The three traditional indicators of value used to assess real
and personal property include the "comparable sales" or "market"
8
9
10
approach,

the "cost" approach,

and the "income" approach.

Tr. 155, 159, 203. The Commission used the cost approach and the
comparable sales or market approach in determining the value of
8
Under the "comparable sales" or "market" approach, the
value of a subject property is determined by comparing that
property with recent sales of similar property. Tr. 155,
203.
9
Under the "cost" approach, an appraiser determines what it
Footnote cont.

Q

Amax's property.

Tr. 152, 155.

The Commission's assessor

testified that he did not use the income approach because "since
the facility has been started, [it] has not been able to produce
any income . . . ."

Tr. 160.

Specifically, the value of Amax's real property (i.e., the
land owned in fee upon which the Plant is situated) was set on
the basis of comparable land values-

Tr. 155.

The value of

improvements at the Plant and the Ponds was based upon the cost
approach using "replacement cost new less depreciation," Tr. 152;
id. at 155-156, as determined from personal property schedules
developed by the Property Tax Division.

Tr. 151.

These

schedules were developed as a convenient way of applying the
traditional "cost or market approaches to value."

Tr. 207.

Footnote cont.
would cost to replace the subject property. That value is
then reduced by use of a "depreciation table[] to bring the
value new down to a current value based on the age of the
asset you're appraising." Tr. 156.
10

Under the "income" approach, the projected net income of a
subject property is discounted by a "capitalization rate" to
determine the value of the property. Tr. 185-187. Various
factors, including risk, the cost of capital, and the
expected return on capital, influence the "capitalization
rate" used in this method. Id.

11

Although the Property Tax Division personnel sometimes
used the terms "comparable values" and "market approach"
rather than the term "comparable sales," even a casual
reading of the record discloses that they used these terms
to refer to the traditional appraisal concept of "comparable
sales." For example, the three traditional appraisal
approaches to valuation were described by Mr. Sheldon
Draper, a manager within the Property Tax Division, as the
"cost, market and income approach." Tr. 203. These three
approaches are alternatively described in standard appraisal
texts as "sales comparison, cost, and income
Footnote cont.
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Importantly, the Commission's own staff admitted that the
comparable sales and cost techniques used to value Amax's
property did not differ from the comparable sales or cost
methodologies that would have been used by the Tooele County
assessor.

For example, in determining the "cost less

depreciation7' of Amax's personal property, the Commission staff
relied upon schedules compiled by the Property Tax Division of
the State Tax Commission.

Tr. 202-203. Mr. Sheldon Draper,

manager of the section of the Property Tax Division responsible
for compiling those schedules, testified that those schedules are
based upon comparable sales and cost data "commonly used by
appraisers employing the market [or comparable sales] and cost
12
..
approaches to value." Tr. 203
A traditional cost approach
Footnote cont.
capitalization." The Appraisal of Real Estate, 70 (9th ed.,
1987) (American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers). See
n.12, infra.
12

Mr. Draper's testimony on this point is specific:
Q
[By Mr. Buchi] Is the goal of yourself and those
working under you in the preparation of the personal
property schedules to provide an easy means of
calculating fair market value of personal property,
those using those schedules?
A

[By Mr. Draper]

Yes, it is.

Q
Are you acquainted with the three additional [sic;
traditional! indicators of value which are commonly used
to establish fair market value of property?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

What are those three indicators?

A
They are called cost, market [or comparable sales],
Footnote cont.

was also used to value the improvements upon Amax's real
property.

Tr. 152.

As a result, Amax's property would have received the same
assessed value whether it had been appraised by the Commission or
the Tooele County Assessor; either party would have used the same
comparable sale and cost techniques.

Indeed, when the Commission

employee who actually appraised Amax's property was asked whether
his cost approach would "differ in its basic theory and its
ultimate goal from the cost approach that [he] would employ if
[he] were valuing [a county-assessed property such as] the Geneva
Steel plant," he frankly responded:
would."

"I don't think that it

Tr. 152. Thus, the only distinction between an

appraisal of Amax and Geneva Steel is the formal employment of
the appraiser by state rather than local government.

As a

county-assessed property, however, Geneva Steel is entitled to a
20% reduction in the results of a "comparable sales or cost
appraisal method."

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. Amax, by contrast, is

Footnote cont.
and income approach.
Q.
Do the cost and market approaches to value have any
application in valuation of personal property?
A.

Yes they do.

Q.
In developing or revising the personal property
schedules, do you use the same data commonly used by
appraisers employing the market [or comparable sales]
and cost approaches to value?
A.

Yes, we do.
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denied that reduction simply because the Commission —
than a county assessor —

is the one who "uses the comparable

sales or cost appraisal method."
III.

rather

Id.

Proceedings Below
Based on the foregoing, Amax argued that its property was

properly assessed by Tooele County rather than the Commission.
Alternatively, Amax asserted that the Commission's refusal to
apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to the assessed value of Amax's property
violated Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1) of the Utah
Constitution.

The first submission was based upon the assertion

that Amax's holdings were not "property or surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims," and therefore
were not properly assessable by the Commission but "must be
assessed by the county assessor."

U.C.A. § 59-5-3 (1986).

The

second submission was based upon the argument that, because both
the Commission and Tooele County would necessarily use the same
methodology in valuing Amax's property, refusal to accord Amax's
real and tangible personal property the 20% reduction granted
county-assessed real property violated Amax's right to "a uniform
and equal rate of assessment . . . in proportion to the value of
. . . its tangible property. . ." and impermissibly taxed Amax's
intangible property.

Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1), Utah

Constitution.
The Commission rejected both submissions.

Without extended

discussion, the Commission simply announced that "the subject
plant is appurtenant to the mine, i.e., the Great Salt Lake,
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ponds [sic] from which the minerals were extracted."
Statement, Appendix 2 at 4.

Docketing

The Commission therefore concluded

that Amax was ''subject to central assessment under U.C.A.
§ 59-5-3."

Id. 13

The Commission's discussion of the constitutional issue
presented here was equally brief (Docketing Statement, Appendix 2
at 4) :
Section 59-5-4.5 allows a 20% reduction in market value
to property which is locally assessed. The language of
the section does not apply to property which is
centrally assessed such as the subject property. Such
non-application of the exemption to the centrally
assessed property is not unconstitutional. Rio Alaom v.
San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND INTRODUCTION
Amax is entitled to the benefit of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 on two
independent grounds.

First, Amax's property is neither a "mine"

nor "appurtenant" to a mine within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-3
(1986).

The Plant, therefore, "must be assessed by the [Tooele]

county assessor."

Id.

And, as county-assessed property, Amax is

entitled to "take 80% of the value based on comparable sales or
cost appraisal of the [Plant] as its reasonable fair cash value
for purposes of assessment."

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5.

Second, even if

Amax's property is properly assessable by the Commission, the
Commission's refusal to apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 in calculating the

13

The Commission has since concluded, however, that Amax's
Plant should be assessed by Tooele County for 1987 and
subsequent years. See Tr. 146. Indeed, Tooele county
contracted with the staff of the Division of Property
Taxation to perform the 1987 and subsequent appraisals on
behalf of the county.
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''reasonable fair cash value"

of Amax's property violates

Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1) of the Utah Constitution.
The Constitution and implementing statutes guarantee Amax "a
uniform and equal rate of assessment" and forbid taxation of
intangible property.
U.C.P-

Utah Const, art. XIII, §§ 2(10), 3(1);

§ 59-1-1 (1986).

These guarantees are violated where, as

here, a taxpayer is denied a 20% reduction in the assessed value
of its property solely because a state —

rather than a county --

employee "uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal method in
valuing taxable property."

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5.
ARGUMENT

I.

AMAX IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5
BECAUSE ITS PROPERTY MUST BE LOCALLY ASSESSED
By its own terms, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 applies any time "the

comparable sales or cost appraisal method" is used by a "county
assessor" in "valuing taxable property."

The value of Amax's

property has been calculated by means of cost and comparable sales
methods.

Tr. 152, 155-156.

Amax, therefore, is entitled to the

20% reduction established by U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 if its property is
properly assessable by Tooele County rather than the Commission.
Straightforward application of U.C.A. § 59-5-3 (1986) demonstrates
beyond doubt that Amax's property must be assessed by Tooele
County,
Section 59-5-3 enumerates the specific categories of property
to be assessed by the Commission.

14

Among these categories are (1)

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986).
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"all mines and mining claims," (2) "all property or surface
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims," and
(3) any property "deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining
claim" because it is "used exclusively for the purpose of reducing
or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner
thereof."

U.C.A. § 59-5-3.

assessed under this scheme:

Amax's property cannot be centrally
the property is not a "mine'1 or

"appurtenant" to a mine," nor can it be "deemed" appurtenant to a
mine owned by Amax.
Tooele County.

It is, therefore, properly assessable by

Id. ("[a]11 taxable property not required by the

Constitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax commission
must be assessed by the county assessor of the several counties in
which the same is situated"). 15
A.

Amax's Property Is Not A "Mine" Or "Mining Claim"

Utah Code Ann. § 59-3-1(8) (1986)16

defines a "mine" as "a

natural deposit of . . . valuable mineral."

"Mining claim" is not

defined and must be presumed to have been used to describe mining
claims initiated under federal law.

The Plant is not located on

the Great Salt Lake or on the Ponds, The Plant, instead, is built

15 In addition to mines and mining claims, U.C.A. § 59-5-3
also requires central assessment of various other types of
property, such as pipelines, power lines, canals and public
utilities. These categories of centrally assessed
properties are irrelevant to the present case.
16

Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6).

17

The General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21, et sea.
(1980), authorizes the initiation of "mining claims" on
certain federal lands — claims which are generally
recognized under Utah law. See U.C.A. §§ 40-1-1, et seq.
Footnote cont.
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on a separate parcel of land owned, in fee, by Amax.

The Plant

site contains no "natural deposit" of any "valuable mineral."
U.C.A. § 59-3-1(3) (1986).

Amax extracts no mineral from the

Plant site.

Similarly, the Ponds are not located

Tr. 131, 329.

on the lake but on separate parcels of land, the surface of which
is leased by Amax from the state and federal gc.ernments.

T. 39

The site of the Ponds contains no "natural deposit" of any
"valuable mineral."

U.C.A. § 59-3-1(8) (1986).

Even if it did,

Amax has no rights under its surface use leases to any such
deposit.

Moreover, neither Amax's rights to the fee parcel of

land under the Plant nor to the surface of the leased parcel of
land under the Ponds are "mining claims," either under federal law
or under any other conceivable usage of that term.
The only "natural deposit" of a "valuable mineral" located
anywhere in the general vicinity of the Plant or the Ponds is the
Great Salt Lake itself.

Both the lake and all dissolved minerals

in the waters of the lake, however, are exclusively owned by the
state of Utah.

Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co.. 27, Utah 256, 495 P.2d 31, 32-34 (1972); See
also. Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 501
F.2d n.56 (10th Cir. 1974).

Amax has only "a nonexclusive right

to extract and process" minerals in the lake waters sold to it by
the state on a royalty basis. U.C.A. § 65-1-15(3) (1986) (now

Footnote cont.
See also n. 19 and the accompanying text below for a
discussion of the requirement that statutory terms be
interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meanings.

codified at U.C.A. § 65A-6-l(3).)

Accordingly, Amax is not the

owner of "a mine or mining claim" assessable by the Commission."
B.

Amax's Property Is Not "Appurtenant" To A "Mine"
within The Meaning Of U.C.A, § 59-5-3

Although neither the Plant nor the Ponds are a "mine" or
"mining claim," they can be centrally assessed if they are
"appurtenant" to a mine.

U.C.A. § 59-5-3.

The Commission

concluded, in a single sentence, that "[f]or 1936 the subject
plant is appurtenant to the mine, i.e., the Great Salt Lake, ponds
[sic] from which the minerals were extracted."
Statement, Appendix 2 at 4.

Docketing

This conclusion is ambiguous at best.

If the Commission intended to find that the mine to which the
Plant is appurtenant is the Great Salt Lake, Amax is not the owner

18

Assuming arguendo that the Great Salt Lake constitutes a
"mine," it conceivably could be argued that Amax's equipment
located at the Ponds, or even the Plant itself, is
"machinery used in mining" assessable by the Commission.
U.C.A. § 59-5-3(1)(d) (1986) (now codified at U.C.A.
§ 59-2-201(1)(d).) This argument would be based upon the
definition of "mining" as "the process of producing,
extracting, leaching, evaporating, or otherwise removing a
mineral from a mine." U.C.A. § 59-3-1(9) (1986) (now
codified at U.C.A. § 59-2-102(7). The argument, however,
proves too much because it would lead to the anomalous
result that virtually all equipment utilized by Geneva Steel
— as well as by all oil refineries in the state — is
"machinery used in mining." (Geneva, the various refineries
in the state, and Amax all take minerals that are physically
extracted elsewhere by "mining," transport them to their
property, store them on their property, and manufacture them
into products not found in nature — steel, petroleum
distillates, and magnesium.) This argument would also, as
more particularly discussed sections I.B. and I.e. below,
render superfluous the additional statutory provisions
requiring the Commission to assess property "appurtenant" or
"deemed appurtenant" to a mine or mining claim, since all
property involved in "mining" would automatically be
assessable by the Commission.
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of the mine.

If the Commission intended to find that the nine is

the Ponds, no "natural deposit" of a "valuable mineral" is located
under the Ponds.

Either conclusion is legally erroneous for the

reasons discussed in the immediately preceeding section.
Even if it is assumed for the sake of discussion that either
the Great Salt Lake or the Ponds is a "mine," the Commission's
bald declaration that the Plant is "appurtenant to the mine" is
legally unsupportable.

The plain meaning of the term

"appurtenant," its consistent interpretation by courts throughout
the country, and the Utah legislature's knowledgeable use of the
term in U.C.A. § 59-5-3 and other statutes demonstrate the fallacy
of the Commission's conclusion,
1.

Plain meaning of "appurtenant".

The words used in U.C.A. § 59-5-3 —
of art "appurtenant" —

and particularly the term

must be interpreted and applied in a

manner consistent with "their usually accepted meanings."

Bd. of

Educ. of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Ctv.. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah
1983). 19
According to Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979)
(emphasis added):
[a] thing is 'appurtenant' to something else when it
stands in relation of an incident to a principal and is
19

Accord, Utah County v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah
1985) ("It is a well-established rule of statutory
construction that the terms of a statute should be
interpreted in accord with usually accepted meanings");
Grant v. Utah State Land Board. 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah
1971) ("Foundational rules require that we assume that each
term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should
be given an interpretation and application in accord with
their usually accepted meaning, unless the context otherwise
requires") (footnote omitted).

necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of the
latter. A thing is deemed to be incidental or
appurtenant to land when it is by right used with the
land for its benefit.
A similar definition is found in tne Dictionary of Real Estate
Appraisers 16 (1984) (American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers), which defines an appurtenance as "[s]omething that
has been added or appended to a property and has become an
inherent part of the property; usually passes with the property
20
when title is transferred."
Even the layman's definition of
"appurtenant" is in accord.

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate

Dictionary 98 (1985) defines an "appurtenance" as "an incidental
right (as a right-of-way) attached to a principal property right
21
and passing in possession with it."
None of the above "usually accepted meanings" (Bd. of Educ. of
Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cty., supra, 659 P.2d at 1035) support
the Commission's conclusion that the Plant is "appurtenant" to the
Great Salt Lake or the Ponds.

20

The Plant is not an "incident" of

See also 2 Tiffany, The Law Of Real Property And Other
Interests In Land § 448 (1920):
The word "appurtenance" is properly confined to things of
an incorporeal character, such as easements or profits a
prendre, and a conveyance of land "with the
appurtenances" will not pass land other than that
described, on the theory that it is appurtenant thereto,
or, as the rule is usually expressed, "land cannot be
appurtenant to land."

21

Webster's defines "appurtenant" as "constituting a legal
accompaniment." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
98 (1985).
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the lake and/or Ponds, nor is it "necessarily connected with the
use and enjoyment" of the Ponds.

Black's Law Dictionary at 94.

The Plant is near the lake and the Ponds, but that fortuitous
proximity is not mandated by any exigency in the manufacture of
magnesium.

Indeed, the Plant was to have been built in the

Pacific Northwest to take advantage of low energy costs.

Tr. 35.

The Plant was built in Utah only after concessions offered by
public utilities and state and local government officials made it
economically feasible to locate the Plant in Utah.

Tr. 35-37.

Thus, it would be more appropriate, although still incorrect, to
argue that the Ponds are an "incident" of or are for "the use and
enjoyment" of the Plant.
of the Plant —

The Ponds have been used for the benefit

not the other way around.

The remaining definitions of "appurtenant" display even more
clearly the absurdity of treating the Plant as an "appurtenance"
of the Great Salt Lake and/or the Ponds. Amax's ownership of the
Plant, of course, did not arise "by right" of its nonexclusive
agreement to purchase brines from the Great Salt Lake from the
state of Utah on a royalty basis, nor from its state or federal
surface use leases of the land under the Ponds.

Blacks Law

Dictionary at 94. The Plant is not "an inherent part" of either
the royalty/purchase agreement with the state of Utah nor its
state and federal surface use leases.

Nor would title to the

Plant pass with the sale or transfer of either the

royalty/purchase agreement or the surface use leases.
Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal at 16. The Plant, in short,
is not an "incidental right" that "pass[es] in possession with"
the lake or Ponds.

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at

98.

The Plant, therefore, is not legally ''appurtenant" to the
lake or the Ponds. 23
2.

Judicial construction of "appurtenant".

The foregoing definitions of "appurtenant" are derived from a
consistent line of judicial opinions interpreting the term.

There

22 Indeed, Amax subsequently sold its rights to a portion of
the Ponds to a third party. Neither Amax nor the third
party claimed that this sale included title to the Plant as
an "appurtenance" to the Ponds.
23 Although there is no discussion supporting the
Commission's order, the conclusion that the Plant rs
"appurtenant" to the Great Salt Lake must be based simply
upon the proximity of the Plant to the lake. The Property
Tax Division, in fact, argued below that the "word
'appurtenant' [in U.C.A. § 59-5-3] should be understood to
mean 'adjacent' or 'adjunct'" because the lake, Ponds and
Plant "cannot pass as 'appurtenances' (as that term is
ordinarily understood in real estate) . . . ." Post Hearing
Brief of Respondent at 20-21. The Division, therefore,
effectively conceded that the Plant is not legally
"appurtenant" to the lake or Ponds. The Division, however,
attempted to escape the consequences of this concession by
asserting that "appurtenant" should be construed as
"synonymous" with such terms as "adjunct," "annexed to," and
"adjacent." Id. at 20. Such reasoning is unsound.
Equating "appurtenant" with "adjunct" or "adjacent" would
transform myriads of highways and commercial facilities into
"appurtenances" of the Great Salt Lake. Moreover, as shown
in Section I.B.(3) below, there is no indication that the
Utah legislature intended to adopt such an expansive reading
of a well-known, common law term. On the contrary, the
legislature provided a specific "deemed appurtenant"
provision to cover circumstances outside the common law
sweep of "appurtenant."
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are, indeed, myriads of cases —

from Utah

and other states —

which construe "appurtenant" consistently with the definitions set
out above.

These judicial pronouncements generally follow the

24 E.g., Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983) (water
rights appurtenant to land); Utah State Road Commission v.
Miva. 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) (rights of access, light and
air appurtenant to land) ; Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assoc,
Inc., 508 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1973) (easement appurtenant to
land); Amoss v. Bennion, 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969) (mineral
rights appurtenant to land).
25

E.g., Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304, 314 (1891)
(the term "appurtenant" involves the idea of dependence, and
includes easements and servitudes used and enjoyed with the
lands for whose benefit they were created); Denver Center
for Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299, 307 (Colo.
1985) ("appurtenances" generally refers to intangible
rights, such as water rights or easements, that necessarily
must be conveyed for beneficial use of land); Smith v.
Harris, 311 P.2d 325, 333-334, (Kan. 1957) (an
"appurtenance" is something belonging to another thing as
principal and passing as incident to it); Owsley /. Hamner,
227 P.2d 263, 267 (Ca. 1951) (en banc)( "appurtenance"
includes everything reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of
the interest conveyed as an incident to it); Von Rohr v.
Neelv, 173 P.2d 828, 829 (Cal. 1946) (a thing is
"appurtenant" to something else when it stands in the
relation of an incident to and is necessarily connected with
the use and enjoyment of the principal . . . and agreeing in
its nature and quality with the thing to which it is
appendant or appurtenant); La Rue v. Greene County Bank, 166
S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (Tenn. 1942) ("appurtenance" means that
which belongs to something else, or something belonging to
another thing as principal and passing as incident to it, as
a right of way or other easement to land); Szilagy v.
Taylor, 25 N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ohio 1939) (an "appurtenance" is
an article adapted to the use of the property to which it is
connected, and which was intended to be a permanent
accession to the freehold); Alwes v. Richheimer, 47 S.W.2d
1084, 1085 (Ark. 1932) (an "appurtenance" is a thing
belonging to another thing as a principal which passes as
incident to the principal thing); Joplin Waterworks Co. v.
Jasper County. 38 S.W.2d 1068, 1076 (Mo. 1931)
("appurtenances" are things belonging to another thing as
principal, and which pass as incident to the principal
thing; a thing used with and related to or dependent upon
something else which is its principal); In re Eastern
Footnote cont.

early, authoritative exposition of the term "appurtenant" by the
Supreme Court in Harris et at. v. Elliott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 25,
53 (1336) :
This tern, both in common parlance and in legal
acceptation, is used to signify something appertaining to
another thing as principal, and which passes as an
incident to the principal thing. Lord Coke says (Coke
Lit. 121, b ) , a thing corporeal cannot properly be
appurtenant to a thing corporeal, nor a thing incorporeal
to a thing incorporeal. According to this rule, land
cannot be appurtenant to land . . . . [I]t would be
absurd, to allow the fee of one piece of land, not
mentioned in the deed, to pass as appurtenant to another
distinct parcel, which is expressly granted by precise
and definite boundaries.
See also Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. United States, 545
F.2d 116, 127 (Ct. CI. 1976) (quoting Harris v. Elliott, supra).
The proper judicial construction of the term "appurtenant" is
demonstrated by Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W. 1094
(Tex. App. 1917) , where, on facts analogous to this case, the
court held that a warehouse was not "appurtenant" to a factory.

Footnote cont.
Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, City of New York, 24 3
N.Y.S. 57, 61 (App. Div. 1930) (land cannot pass as
"appurtenant" to land except in case of land under water);
Mt. Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 73 P. 826, 828 (Cal. 1903)
(a thing is deemed to be incidental or "appurtenant" to land
when it is by right used with the land for its benefit, as
in the case of a way or watercourse, or of a passage for
light, air or heat from or across the land of another);
McClenaahan v. McEachern. 34 S.E. 627, 628 (S.C. 1899) (the
word "appurtenant" necessarily involves the idea that the
owner of a dominant tenement has some legal right in the
premises appurtenant to it); Kingswav R. & M. Corp. v.
Kingswav Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S. 265 (App. Div. 1928) (an
appurtenance does not include an interest in adjoining lands
owned by landlord, since land never passes as appurtenance
to land; word "appurtenance" signifies anything that is an
incident of and belongs to some other thinr as a principal
.

.

.

* j
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There, a company operating a cottonseed oil plant executed a deed
of trust conveying its factory to the trustee "together with all
and singular the rights and appurtenances to the same belonging or
in any wise incident or appertaining."

193 S.W. at 1094. Upon

foreclosure, the purchaser at the trustee's sale argued that a
seedhouse —

erected by the cottonseed company on land some miles

away from the factory —
by the deed of trust.

was "appurtenant" to the property covered

The court rejected this assertion,

reasoning that an "appurtenance" is "[a] thing belonging to
another thing as principal, and which passes as incident to the
principal thing."

193 S.W. at 1095. The court concluded that

there was no such relationship between the factory and a seedhouse
built upon a separate parcel of land.

"Certainly no one reading

the description as set forth in the deed of trust upon which
appellee's right is based could reasonably conclude that a
seedhouse a number of miles in the country could be held to be an
appurtenance to the lots . . . upon which the oil mill was
situated."

Id.

Similar reasoning compels an identical result here.

Surely no

one reading Amax's state and federal leases or its nonexclusive
royalty/purchase agreement with the state could reasonably
conclude that a magnesium manufacturing facility, located on land
owned in fee miles away from the Ponds and the lake "could be held
to be an appurtenance to the [leases] . . . upon which the [Ponds
are] situated" or to the lake from which the brines are purchased.
Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., supra. 193 S.W. at 1095.

Indeed, the conclusion that the Plant is not an appurtenance of
the lake or the Ponds follows a fortiori from Balcar: If a
warehouse located on a separate parcel of land does not pass as an
appurtenance to a nearby factory, surely a factory owned in fee
could never pass as an appurtenance to a separate parcel of leased
land or a state-owned lake. To paraphrase the United States
Supreme Court, it would be "absurd" to treat the fee title to the
Plant as appurtenant to Amax's leasehold rights "expressly granted
by precise and definite boundaries."

Harris et al. v. Elliott.

supra, 35 U.S. (10 Pet. ) at 53. 26
3.

Legislative usage of "appurtenant".

The foregoing perhaps could be dismissed if the Utah
legislature, in enacting U.C.A. § 59-5-3, clearly intended to

2 6 Accord, Bowlin v. Federated Mutual Implement & H. Ins.
Co., 357 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1962) (a building on one parcel
of land is not appurtenant to an adjacent parcel of land);
Givens v. Louisville Property Co.'s Assignee, 81 S.W.2d 401,
402 (Ky. 1935) (forfeiture provision in coal mining lease
entitling lessor to enter and take possession of leased
property and "appurtenances" did not authorize the lessor to
take possession of adjoining land leased by the lessee and
used in connection with operation of the coal mine);
Kinaswav R. & M. Corp. v. Kinaswav Repair Cor., 228 N.Y.S.
265, 268 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1928) ("An appurtenance to a lease . . .
does not include an interest in adjoining lands, even though
owned by a common owner, 'since land never passes as
appurtenant to land."); Rutherford v. Wabash R. Co., 48 S.W.
921, 924 (Mo. 1898) (where a group of buildings on one's
land, constituting his coal-mining plant, extended over the
right of way of a railroad company by means of sheds and a
chute over them, the mining buildings cannot be said to be
appurtenant to them, within the provision of a lease of a
right of way agreeing to hold a railroad company harmless
from damages by fire to any building on the leased premises
or their appurtenances).
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adopt a definition of "appurtenant" that diverged from the
accepted common law meaning.

cf. Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244,

243 (Utah App. 1987) ("Statutes are not to be construed as
effecting any change in the common law beyond that which is
clearly indicated.")

The available evidence, however,

demonstrates that the Utah legislature was well acquainted with and did not intend to deviate from —

the accepted, well-known

construction of "appurtenant."
To begin with, the legislature has undoubtedly adopted the
common law meaning of "appurtenant" in other statutes
incorporating the term.

For example, U.C.A. §§ 57-1-12, -13, -14

and -19(5) each provide that all warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds,
mortgages, and trust deeds are presumed to convey or encumber not
only the land expressly described therein, but also "all the
appurtenances thereunto belonging."

Similarly, U.C.A. §§ 73-1-10

and -11 contemplate that all water and water rights "appurtenant
to land shall pass to the grantee of such land."

These statutes

were obviously written with the generally accepted meaning of
"appurtenant" in mind.
254 (Utah 1983).

See, e.g., Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2

Otherwise, every conveyance could be held to

transfer, not only the specifically described property, but also
any other "nearby" property owned by the grantor.

The

legislature, in providing for the conveyance of "appurtenances" i
these statutes, clearly understood —

and did not deviate from —

the standard definitions set out in Sections IB(1), (2), above.

More important, however, is the structural indication — drawn
from the statute itself —

that the legislature was aware of the

common law meaning of "appurtenant" when it enacted U.C.A.
§ 59-5-3.

In drafting U.C.A. § 59-5-3, the legislature not only

provided for central assessment of property "appurtenant" to
mines, the legislature also provided for central assessment of
property that it "deemed" to be appurtenant because "used
exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from
a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof."

Id.

The only way

to give effect to the "deemed appurtenant" provision of U.C.A.
§ 59-5-3 is to restrict the term "appurtenant" to its common law
context.
The legislature included a "deemed appurtenant" provision in
U.C.A. § 59-5-3 in the precise circumstances where it decided to
reach beyond the common law sweep of "appurtenant." The
Commission's broad reading of the term "appurtenant," however,
renders this legislative "deemed appurtenant" provision
superfluous.

According to the Commission, a facility is

"appurtenant" if it is "nearby," "related to" or "beneficial" to a
mine. 27
But, if the Commission is correct, there would never be
a need to invoke the legislative "deemed appurtenant" provision.

27 The Property Tax Division of the State Tax Commission
urged below that, "the question is not whether the AMAX
property is used exclusively to serve the mining claims in
the Great Salt Lake, but rather whether or not the AMAX
manufacturing property was designed used [sic] to benefit
the mine or mining claims." Pre-Hearing Brief of Respondent
at 4.

- 27

Why?

Because all ''mills, reduction works, and smelters" used for

the "purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or
mining claim by the owner thereof" (U.C.A. § 59-5-3) would
certainly be "nearby," "related to" or "beneficial"2 8 to the mine
and thereby already within the sweep of the simple term
"appurtenant."
—

This would be so, moreover, regardless of whether

as the legislature expressly provided —

"exclusive[ ] ."

such use was

idk. at 4.

The Commission's overbroad construction of the term
"appurtenant," therefore, not only ignores the usually accepted
meaning of the term, it also renders the legislature's express
inclusion of a "deemed appurtenant" provision meaningless.

Such a

result contravenes both legislative intent and accepted principles
of statutory construction. 29
The fact that the legislature
expressly included a deemed appurtenant provision in U.C.A.
§ 59-5-3 to cover property not legally appurtenant to a mine
demonstrates beyond doubt that the legislature was aware of — and

28
29

Pre-Hearing Brief of Respondent at 3.

Ward v. Richfield Citv. 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) (the
context of a statute must be considered in determining the
meaning given its terms); Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 130 P.2d 663, 664 (1942) (same); Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
1984) ("[S]eparate parts of an act should not be construed
in isolation from the rest of the act"); Millett v. Clark
Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) (statutory
enactments "are to be construed so as to render all parts
thereof relevant and meaningful"); Horman v. Liquor Control
Commission, 445 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1968) (same).

indeed adopted —

the common law parameters of the term

"appurtenant."
C.

Amax's Property Is Not Within The "Deemed
Appurtenant" Provision Of the Utah Statute

Because neither the Plant nor the Ponds is a "mine" or "mining
claim" and neither is legally "appurtenant" to a mine or mining
claim, they may be centrally assessed only if they fit within the
"deemed appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. § 59-5-3.

They do not.

"[M]ills, reduction works, and smelters" are "deemed
appurtenant" to a mine or mining claim when they are "used
exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from
a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof."

U.C.A. § 59-5-3.

The Plant, but not the Ponds, qualifies as a "mill, reduction
works or smelter."

Id.

The only question, therefore, is whether

the Plant is used "exclusively" to reduce or smelt minerals from a
mine owned by Amax.
This Court has "recognize[d] the strictness of the plain
meaning of 'used exclusively.'"

Loval Order of Moose

No. 259 v.

County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah 1982). 3 0

30

At one time this Court interpreted the word "exclusively,"
as used in the statutory phrase "used exclusively for
charitable purposes," to mean "dominantly" or "primarily."
Salt Lake Lodge No. 85, B.P.O.E. v. Groesbeck. 120 P. 192
(Utah 1911). That definition, however, allowed the tax
exemption for charitable institutions "to drift from the
verbal moorings of the Constitution." Loval Order of Moose,
#259 v. County Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 266
(Utah 1982) (Oaks, J., concurring). Accordingly, in Loyal
Order of Moose, the Court returned the terra "exclusively" to
its ordinary meaning. 657 P.2d at 262-264.

The Property Tax Division asserted below that the term
Footnote cont.
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An

"exclusive use" is "one which is singly or solely devoted."

id.

Prior to 1984, the Plant was used solely to process minerals from
the Ponds, to the exclusion of materials from all other sources.
Beginning in 1984, however, and continuing in all subsequent
years, the Plant has processed brine purchased from sources other
than the Ponds.

Tr. 49.

Consequently, it has not "exclusively"

processed brine from the Ponds since 1983.

Finally, even if the

the Commission's creative definition of the term "exclusive" were
to be accepted, Amax would still not be the "owner" of the lake
("mine") from which the minerals processed by the Plant were
extracted.

Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co., 27, Utah 256, 495 P.2d 31, 32-34 (1972);
U.C.A. § 65-1-15(3) (1986) (now codified at U.C.A. § 65A-6-l(3).

Footnote cont.
"exclusively" in U.C.A, § 59-5-3 actually means "primarily."
That argument, of course, was rejected by this Court in
Loyal Order of Moose, supra, 657 P.2d at 262-264. Moreover,
the legislature has recently amended U.C.A. § 59-5-3 to
replace the word "exclusively" with the term "primarily"
effective January 1, 1988. Compare U.C.A. § 59-5-3 (1986)
with U.C.A. § 59-2-301 (1988). This amendment evidences a
legislative awareness of the fact that, for tax years prior
to 1988, the test for determining whether property is
"deemed appurtenant" to a mine is one of exclusivity.
31 For decisions from other states defining "exclusively" as
"only," "solely," "purely," "wholly," and "to the exclusion
of all other things," see In re Cessna Employees' Flying
Club, 721 P.2d 298, 300-301 (Kan. App. 1986); South Dakota
Auto. Club, Inc. v. Volk, 305 N.W.2d 693, 700 (S.D. 1981);
Citv of Nevada v. Bastow, 328 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. App. 1959);
Ground Water Conservation Dist. No. 2 v. Hawlev, 304 S.W.2d
764, 770 (Tex. App. 1957).
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Amax's property is therefore not assessable by the Commission
under the "deemed appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. § 59-5-3. 3 2
The Commission seriously misconstrued the plain language of
the last sentence of U.C.A, § 59-5-3.

The purpose of that

sentence is to "deem" certain property to be "appurtenant" to a
mine, thereby giving the Commission authority to assess that
property, if the property is used "exclusively" to process ores
and minerals "from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof."
U.C.A. § 59-5-3.

(Thus assuring, for example, that the Kennecott

smelter, which is not "upon" or legally "appurtenant" to a mine,
will nevertheless be subject to central assessment because it is
used "exclusively" to process ores from the Bingham Canyon mine.)
However, if a mill or other manufacturing facility is not used
"exclusively" to refine minerals mined by the owner of the mill,
the mill will escape the "deemed appurtenance" provision and will
be subject to local assessment.
of mills and smelters who —

The sentence thus permits owners

like Amax and Geneva Steel —

do not

"exclusively" process their own minerals to avoid central
assessment.

It does not, as the Commission apparently reasoned,

3 2 In a somewhat confused reference to the "deemed
appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. § 59-5-3, the Commission
wrote (Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 4-5):
If the plant were used exclusively to produce magnesium
from brine purchased from outside suppliers it would not
be appurtenant to the mine from which the minerals were
extracted, and it would be subject to assessment by
local authorities.
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subject the owner of such a facility to central assessment unless
it "exclusively" refines raw materials purchased elsewhere.
In enacting U.C.A. § 59-5-3, the Utah legislature provided
that mines and mining claims, properties "appurtenant" to mines or
mining claims, and properties "deemed appurtenant" by reason of
their exclusive use "by the owner" of a mine or mining claim
should be centrally assessed.

This Court must "assume that each

term in the statute was used advisedly" and "interpret[] and
a

PPl[y]

the

statute according to its literal wording."

Home. 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987).
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).

Home v.

Accord, West Jordan v.
Amax's Plant does not

fall within the literal wording of any applicable category of
centrally assessed property and therefore should have been
assessed by the Tooele county assessor.33
As a locally assessed
property, Amax is entitled to "take 80% of the value based on
comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property as its
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment."

U.C.A.

§ 59-5-4.5. The Commission's contrary conclusion must be
reversed.
II.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-4.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS APPLIED TO THE ASSESSMENT OF AMAX'S PROPERTY
Amax argued below that, even if it were appropriate to

centrally assess its property (which it is not), the Commission

3 3 Indeed, even the Commission now recognizes that, beginning
in tax year 1987, the Plant must be assessed by Tooele
County. See Tr. 14 6.

would be required to use U.C.A, § 59-5-4.5 in computing the
34
property's "reasonable fair cash value."

The Commission

rejected this submission on the grounds that U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5
"does not apply to property which is centrally assessed" and
"[s]uch non-application of the exemption to the centrally assessed
property is not unconstitutional.
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)."

Rio Alaom v. San Juan County,

Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 4.

Contrary to the conclusion of the Commission, however, this
Court's decision in Rio Alaom does not uphold the
constitutionality of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax's
property.

Indeed, the principles enunciated in that opinion

demonstrate that refusal to apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 in calculating
the "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property violates
Amax's right to "a uniform and equal rate of assessment" of its
tangible property "according to its value in money."

Utah Const.

art. XIII, § 3(1). Moreover, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 must be applied to
Amax's property to avoid improper taxation of intangible property.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(10).
A.

This Court's Decision In Rio Alaom Does Not
Dispose Of The Constitutional Challenge Here

In Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184 (Utah
1984), this Court upheld U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 against a
challenge that the statute was "facially unconstitutional."

681

P.2d at 187. That decision, however, does not control the
disposition of this case. Rio Alaom was decided without a factual
34

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986).
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record.

631 P.2d at 137. This case, by contrast, comes before

the Court with a record demonstrating the actual operation of
U.c.A. § 59-5-4.5. The record, furthermore, unequivocally
demonstrates that, instead of promoting "a uniform and equal rate
of assessment on all tangible property . . . according to its
value in money" (Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)), U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5
—

as applied to Amax's property —

"establishes] [a] formal

classification[] of property that result[s] in nonuniform or
disproportionate tax burdens."

Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 193.

The plaintiffs in Rio Alaom "adduced no evidence of actual
nonuniformity in the tax assessments of state-assessed properties
as compared with county-assessed properties."

681 P.2d at 193.

The case, in fact, was decided upon the factual assumption that
there was a significant disparity in property values calculated t
county as opposed to state assessors.

Id. at 190, 193. This

disparity was assumed to result from the fact that, while the
State Tax Commission often used income or other valuation methods
that gave "very little effect to the impact of inflation in the
assessment process," the cost and comparable sales methods used
most frequently by county assessors were "highly sensitive to
inflation."

Id. at 189, 190. The Court emphasized that the

"factual premise that state valuation and county valuation were
not uniform has not been attacked."

Id. at 193.

Indeed, the

State Tax Commission "denied that all property under its
jurisdiction was assessed at its current fair cash value and

further denied that the plaintiff's property was assessed at 100
percent of the current fair cash value."

Id. at n.3.

On the Pin Alaon record, therefore, the Court concluded that
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 was not facially invalid.

Instead, the Court

was "obliged to presume that there is a valid factual basis for
the challenged statute;" i.e., elimination of a conceded disparity
in the outcome of county and state assessments (681 P.2d at
193-194):
[T]he Legislature may seek to enforce the uniformity
requirement of [Utah Const, art. XIII] § 3(1) by
attempting to equalize the tax burden borne by those
taxpayers who pay a greater tax in proportion to the
value of their property than others. In permitting
transaction costs to be deducted from appraisals based on
comparable sales or cost appraisal method, the
Legislature has neither departed from the "cash value"
requirement of Article XIII, § 3(1), nor gone beyond its
constitutional duty to "prescribe by law such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation." Id.
The Court may not indulge in a similar presumption here.

On the

contrary, the record in this case shows a clear constitutional
violation. 35

35

The Court did invalidate a property tax "rollback" statute
in Rio Alaom. That statute rolled the assessed value of
"all locally-assessed real property" back to 1978 levels.
681 P.2d at 194. The Court held the rollback statute
unconstitutional because, "[t]o freeze the value of some
properties at a given point in time, and not others, must
necessarily result in nonuniform assessments." 681 P.2d at
195.

- 35

B.

Refusal To Apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 In Calculating
The "Reasonable Fair Cash Value'' Of Amax's
Property Violates The Company's Constitutional
Right To A Uniform And Equal Rate Of Assessment

Article XIII, Section 3(1) of the Utah Constitution requires
the legislature to "provide by law a uniform and equal rate of
assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its
value in money."

This constitutional mandate has been interpreted

as requiring reasonable equality and uniformity in the assessment
of taxable real and personal property.
Comm'n, 452 P.2d 876 (Utah 1969).

Harmer v. State Tax

As the Court noted in Rio

Algom, the constitutional language "mean[s] that property should
be valued 'as near as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash
value; in other words . . . the valuation for assessment and
taxation shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal to the
cash value for which the property valued would sell in the open
market . . . . ' "

Rio Algom 681 P.2d at 190 (quoting State ex rel.

Cunningham v. Thomas, 50 P. 615, 616 (1897)).

Accord, U.C.A.

§ 59-5-1 (1986) ("[a]11 taxable property, not specifically exempt
under Article XIII, Sec. 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value . . . " ) .
Section 59-5-4.5 represents a legislative determination that
certain assessment methods —

specifically, the "cost'' and

"comparable sales" methods —

overstate the "reasonable fair cash

value" of appraised property.

The statute, therefore, gives a 2 0%

reduction in the calculation of "reasonable fair cash value" when
"the county assessor uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal

method in valuing taxable property,"
classification that gives some —

Id.

Whether a legislative

but not all —

taxpayers an

immediate 20% deduction meets the standards of equality and
uniformity imposed by Article XIII, § 3(1) of the Utah
Constitution is c:\estionable.
(Utah 1920).

Stillman v. Lynch, 192 P. 272, 279

See Note, "Recent Developments in Utah Law," 1985

Utah L. Rev. 131, 214 (1985) ("The

fRio Alaoml decision has given

the legislature a statutory means of mitigating the increase in
property taxes, but the basis for mitigation is a statute that
36
arguably is unconstitutional").

Nevertheless, this Court

concluded that U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 was not facially unconstitutional
because —

at least in some circumstances —

factual basis for the challenged statute."

there was "a valid
681 P.2d at 193.

The "valid factual basis" for U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 identified by
the Court in Rio Alaom flows from two legislative findings.

36

The editors of the Utah Law Review concluded that, despite
this Court's reasoning, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is
indistinguishable from the property tax rollback statute
held unconstitutional in Rio Alaom (1985 Utah L. Rev. at
212) :
The rollback statute was held unconstitutional because it
caused property to be assessed at a value that, although
originally based on market value, was less than market
value. Although the court held otherwise, the eighty
percent limitation [of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5] arguably has
the same effect . . . .
An argument . . . can be made
that the eighty percent limitation statute also violates
the uniformity and equality provisions of the
constitution because it does not use the constitutionally
prescribed market value as the basis for calculating the
tax.
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First, U.C.A. § 59-5-4,5 itself embodies a legislative
determination that the comparable sales and cost appraisal methods
include "various fees, services, closing costs, and other
expenses" which "lessen the actual amount that may be received in
the transaction."

Id.

Second, the legislative history of U.C.A.

§ 59-5-4.5 suggests that the statute represents a legislative
attempt to "equalize" the tax burden between state- and countyassessed taxpayers.

681 P.2d at 193. Neither of these

legislative findings, however, provides a "valid factual basis"
for the constitutionality of the statute as applied to Amax.

631

P.2d at 193.
Initially, even assuming that the legislature is correct in
finding that cost and market appraisal methods "overvalue"
property by approximately 20% because those methods include
37
.
.
.
various fees and closing costs,
that finding provides no
legitimate basis for discriminating between state- and countyassessed properties.

After all, if county assessors using cost

and market appraisal methods can be expected to overvalue property
by approximately 20%, the same can be expected of state assessors
38
using the identical methods.
Therefore, because all property

3 7 The Court in Rio Alaom noted that, *[s]ince there is no
claim in this case that the amount of the transaction costs
provided for in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is factually arbitrary,
the reasonableness of the amount of these costs is in effect
conceded." 681 P.2d at 193.
38 The state assessor here, in fact, asserted that he did not
believe that his appraisal would diverge from values fixed
by a county assessor. Tr. 152.
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in the state must be assessed at a "uniform and equal rate" (Utah
Const, art. XIII, § 3(1), the legislature cannot —
something more —

without

give some properties assessed by means of cost

and market methods a 20% break (i.e., properties assessed by
counties) while denying that break to other, similarly assessed
properties (i.e., properties assessed by the state).
39
Lynch, supra, 192 P.2d at 279.

Stillman v.

"Something more" that might justify a distinction between
state- and county-assessed properties could include a
demonstrated, actual disparity between the outcomes of state- and
county-conducted assessments.

Indeed, it was this precise

"something more" that supported the facial validity of U.C.A.
§ 59-5-4.5 in Rio Alaom.

39

There, the Court upheld the statute as a

In Stillman, this Court struck down a property tax statute
that provided a special deduction from the assessed value of
bank stock. The reasoning of the Court is directly
applicable to this case (192 P.2d at 279):
The section under consideration plainly gives to bank
stockholders a deduction given to no other class of
taxpayers . . . .
This is an exemption or deduction not
accorded to other classes or groups of taxpayers, and is,
therefore, beyond any question of doubt, repugnant to the
Constitution, which provides for uniformity of taxation.
Not only do we find no warrant in the Constitution that
permits the deduction made by the Legislature, but, in
our opinion, the deduction is prohibited by the
Constitution, Suppose the legislature had enacted a law
putting farmers in a separate class for purposes of
taxation, and had given them a flat 20 per cent,
reduction in the assessment of their property. Would any
one question the invalidity of such a law? It would be
rank and indefensible class legislation that could not
possibly be harmonized with the Constitution.
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valid legislative attempt to "equalize" state and local
assessments.

681 P.2d at 193.

But, as noted above, Rio Alaom was

decided without a factual record and upon the presumption that a
disparity between state and local valuations actually existed.
Id. & n.3.

This case, however, does not present a mere facial

challenge.

Moreover, unlike the situation in Rio Alaom, Amax has

developed a record which demonstrates that, rather than
"equalizing" tax burdens, the Commission's refusal to apply u.C.A.
§ 59-5-4.5 in calculating the "reasonable fair cash value" of
Amax's property "result[s] in nonuniform assessments" throughout
Tooele County.

Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 195.

Amax's unequal access to the benefit of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5
cannot be justified by any assumption that taxpayers assessed by
Tooele County "pay a greater tax in proportion to the value of
their property" than Amax.

Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 193. The

record, in fact, unequivocally shows just the opposite.

The

"income" method of appraisal, which arguably diverges from
appraisal methods used by county assessors (Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at
190, 193), has not been used to assess Amax's holdings.

Instead,

Amax's property has been assessed by means of cost and comparable
sales data identical to that which would have been used by the
Tooele County assessor.

Tr. 152, 155-156, 202-203.

The Property

Tax Division employee who appraised Amax's property even asserted
that his own appraisal would not differ from a county-conducted
assessment.

Tr. 152. And, unlike the situation in Rio Alaom, the

Commission has never asserted that the value placed on Amax's

property is less than "100 percent of the current fair cash
value."

681 P.2d at 193 n.3.

On the contrary, the Commission and

its employees have strenuously argued that the valuation placed on
Amax's property represents the property's full current fair cash
value.

Tr. 253.40

Thus, the sole basis for denying Amax the 20% reduction
embodied in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is the arid justification offered by
the Commission: "The language of the section does not apply to
property which is centrally assessed such as the subject
property."

Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 4 (emphasis added).

The Commission's naked reliance upon the formal legislative
classification of Amax's property as "centrally assessed,"
however, simply does not pass constitutional muster.

40

"Certainly

The record on this point is explicit (Tr. 253):
Q
[By Mr. Miller, attorney for Property Tax Division]
Now, Mr. Stewart, in light of the testimony that you
heard yesterday from AMAX and Mr. Edwards, do you feel
that your evaluation of AMAX property for 1986 arrives
at a fair market value?
A
[By John Stewart, appraiser, Property Tax Division]
Referring to the figure of approximately $78 million?
Q

Yes.

A

Yes, I do.

Q
In light of the testimony that was offered by AMAX
yesterday, are there any further adjustments that you
wish to make in your valuation of AMAX for 1986?
A
None that I can think of that we've had a chance to
review.
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the Legislature nay not establish formal classifications of
property that result in nonuniform or disproportionate tax
burdens."

Rio Alaon, 681 P.2d at 193.

It is obvious that nothing except the formal classification of
the Plant and the Ponds as "centrally assessed" supports the nonapplicability of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to Amax.

Amax is denied the

benefit of a 20% deduction in calculating the "reasonable fair
cash value" of its property simply because that property is
assessed by a state rather than a county employee, and includes
personal as well as real property.

As a result, Amax has been

required "to shoulder an unfair portion of the taxes" in violation
of "the requirement of uniformity."

Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 193.

The record establishes beyond doubt the constitutional invalidity
of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax. 41

41 Amax, of course, recognizes that "[b]ecause of the
necessity to use different methods for assessing different
types of property, a certain degree of de facto
classification is unavoidable." Rio Alaom, "31 P.2d at 191.
The level of unequal, discriminatory classir^cation
exemplified by the application of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to the
facts of this case, however, far exceeds any permissible
level of de facto classification. The Court upheld the
facial validity of the statute in Rio Alaom solely because
it assumed that the income-based valuation methods
presumably used by the Commission were more inflation
sensitive (and therefore resulted in lower valuations) than
the cost and comparable sales methods used by the counties.
The 20% reduction accorded county properties therefore
simply "equalize[d] the tax burden borne" by state- and
county-assessed taxpayers. 681 P.2d 189-190, 193. Here,
there is nothing to "equalize;" Amax's and county-assessed
properties are valued by means of the same techniques.
Therefore, application of the statute to county-assessed
properties — but not to Amax — distorts rather than
"equalizes" tax burdens within the county.

Because refusal to apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to Amax's property
is "in violation of the principle of uniformity" (Rio Algom, 631
P.2d at 195), Amax is entitled to the 20% reduction set forth in
the statute.

"The overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of Article

XIII [of the Utah Constitution] is to achieve uniformity in the ad
valorem taxing scheme."

Id., 681 P.2d at 194.

is "'the just and ultimate purpose of the law.'"

Indeed, equality
Id. (quoting

Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct.
190-192 (1923)).

The only way that the fundamental goals of

uniformity and equality can be met is by extension of the 20%
deduction to all of Amax's property assessed by "cost" and
"comparable sales" methods.

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5.

As the Court

recognized in Rio Algom (681 P.2d at 194) (quoting Kittery
Electric Light Co. v. Assessors of the Town of Kitterv, 219 A.2d
728, 734 (Me. 1966)):
To assess property at its just value is only one of the
fundamental requirements of law. The assessment must
further represent the owner's equal portion of the
burden of taxation, and if the assessors have not
appraised at full value but only at a fixed percentage
of true value, then such treatment must be uniform and
equal on all real estate and tangible property, so much
so that if both cannot be obtained then equality must
prevail.
42Cf. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43
S.Ct. 190 (192 3) (bridge owner whose property was assessed at
full value while surrounding properties were undervalued was
entitled to have "his assessment reduced to the percentage of
that value at which others are taxed;" the Court concluded that
"where it is impossible to secure both the standards of the
true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law,
the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and
ultimate purpose of the law"). See also Hillsborough Township
v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946) (the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the individual from
Footnote cont.
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County-assessed properties valued upon the basis of cost and
comparable sales data are entitled to a 20% deduction in
calculating their "reasonable fair cash value."

Amax's property,

whether state or county assessed, is entitled to uniform
treatment.
Finally, Amax is entitled to the benefit of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5
in

calculating the "reasonable fair cash value" of all of its

property —

both real and personal.

Just as there is no

constitutionally permissible basis for formal classifications of
state- and county-assessed property, there is no constitutionally
permissible basis for formal classifications of real and tangible

Footnote cont.
state action that selects him out for discriminatory treatment
by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same
class); Maricopa County v. North Central Dev. Co., 566 P.2d 683
(Ariz. App. 1977) (an intentional scheme which results in the
assessment of the few "more prominent" construction projects
violates equal protection); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County
Assessor Etc., 592 P.2d 965 (N.M. 1978) (frequent revaluation
of property where other properties in the county were not
systematically revalued violated the taxpayer's right to equal
protection). And see also Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v.
Eagerton, 472 F. Supp. 60, 64 (N.D. Ala. 1979) ("the Court
concludes that the federal statute prohibiting tax
discrimination against rail transportation property which
became effective February 5, 1979 [The Railroad Revitalization
Regulatory and Reform Act of 1976], requires the State of
Alabama to reduce the assessment ration for railroad property
to the assessment ratio of other commercial and industrial
property for the 1979 tax year"); General American Transp.
Corp, v. Com, of Kentucky, 791 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1986) (same);
Burlington Northern Railroad Co, v. Dep't of Revenue of
Wisconsin. 604 F. Supp. 1575 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (same); General
Am. Transp. Corp. v. La. Tax Comm'n. 511 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. La.
1981) (same); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Louisiana
Tax Com'n. 498 F. Supp. 418 (M.D. La. 1980); Tennessee v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D.
Tenn. 1979) .
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personal property which result in nonuniform treatment.

Section

59-5.4 # 5 ; moreover, makes no distinction between taxable real and
taxable personal property.

Rather, the statute requires a 20%

reduction in value when the "cost" or "comparable sales"
valuation method is used.

Taxable property, of course, includes

both real and tangible personal property.

U.C.A. 59-2-102(10)

(1988) (defining property as "property which is subject to
assessment and taxation according to its value".)

The 20%

reduction provided by U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5, therefore, should apply
to all of Amax's property that is valued by means of cost of
43
comparable sales appraisals.

43

Amax would also direct the Court's attention to the fact
that, although the 20% tax break for county assessed
property is designed to be temporary, the statute in all
probability will not die a natural death without a little
nudge from this Court. The predecessor to the version of
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 at issue here had been repealed prior to
the decision in Rio Alaom. Act of January 30, 1982, ch. 66,
§ 6, 1982 Utah Laws 249. When re-enacted in 1984 following
Rio Alaom, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 was to have expired in 1986, by
which time the Commission was to have developed uniform
assessment methods for state and county assessors. Note,
"Recent Developments In Utah Law," 1985 Utah L. Rev. 131,
213 the "reenactment . . . is only temporary; . . . the
State Tax Commission is to develop and implement comparable
sales or cost appraisal methods that do not include
transactional costs by January 1, 1986").

The Commission, however, has never developed the uniform
assessment methods foreseen in 1984. The legislature, in
response, has simply kept rolling back the expiration date
of the statute. E.g.. House Bill 352 (1986) ; Senate Bill 71
(1987); Senate Bill 59 (1988). The 20% tax break for
county-assessed properties is currently set to expire in
1990. U.C.A. § 59-2-304(2) (1988). The Commission and the
legislature apparently lack the will to abide the uniformity
and equality mandate of Article XIII, Section 3(1) of the
Utah Constitution. This Court cannot be as flacid.
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C.

The Commission Must Assess Amax's Property
At 80% Of Value To Avoid Improper Taxation
Of Intangible Property

Article XIII, Section 2(10) of the Utah Constitution provides
that "[i]ntangible property may be exempted from taxation
as property or it may be taxed as property in such manner and to
sucn extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as
property the income therefrom shall not also be taxed."

The

legislature has elected to exempt intangible property from
taxation as property and to tax the income therefrom.

U.C.A.

§ 59-1-1 (1986) . The Constitution and implementing statutes of
the State of Utah, therefore, prohibit the taxation of intangible
property for ad valorem tax purposes•
The legislature has recognized that assessments based on
comparable sales or cost appraisal methods include in the
valuation the amount of various fees, services, closing costs and
other intangible values.

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. Ad valorem taxation

of the value attributable to these intangibles would violate
U.C.A. § 59-1-1 and Article XIII, Section 2(10) of the Utah
Constitution.

Consequently, county assessors are statutorily

required to "take 80 percent of the value based on comparable
sales or cost appraisal of the property as its reasonable fair
cash value for purposes of assessment."

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5.

Amax's property has been valued by means of the same cost and
comparable sales methods employed by county assessors (Tr. 152),
but the Commission did not reduce the appraised value of Amax's
property by 20% to account for the intangible values described in

U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5

Tr. 154. Thus, the valuation methods used by

the Commission have captured the nontaxable value of the
intangible property described in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 —

a value

which the legislature has set at 20% of the total value derived by
these methods.

Since the intangible property of Amax referred to

in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is constitutionally and statutorily exempt
from ad valorem taxation, Amax is entitled to a 20% reduction in
the assessed value of its property —

regardless of whether that

property is assessed by the Commission or county assessors.
CONCLUSION
The final decision of the Commission should be reversed.

The

Court should direct that Amax's property is properly assessable by
Tooele County and, accordingly, that U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 controls
the determination of the "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's
real and personal property.

In the alternative, the Court sh^-ild

direct the Commission to calculate the "reasonable fair cash
value" of Amax's real and personal property pursuant to the
formula set out in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5.
Respectfully submitted,

Mark K. Buchi
David K. Detton
Richard G. Wilkins
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 521-5800
October 26, 1988

Attorneys for Petitioner
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APPENDIX A

The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-1 (1986) [now codified
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-103(1), and 59-2-110-1 (2) (g) (1983)]
provides:
All tangible property in this state, not exempt under
the laws of the United States or under the Constitution of
this state, shall be taxed in proportion to its value as
hereinafter provided. Intangible property shall be exempt
from ad valorem assessment, levy and taxation, but nothing
in this title contained shall be construed to prevent the
inclusion of income from property whether tangible or
intangible, in the basis of any tax upon, or measured by,
income.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1988) provides:
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair
market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise
provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(2)(g) (1988) provides:
(2)

The following property is exempt from taxation:

(g)

intangible property.

The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986) [now codified
at Utah Code Ann. *§ 59-2-103 (1988)] provides:
All taxable property, not specifically exempt under
Article XIII, Sec. 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value and
that value must be reported on the tax notice mailed to
the property owner as provided in Section 59-10-10.
Adjustments, on forms prescribed by the tax commission
under Subsection 59-5-46(4), shall be made to the
reasonable cash value as provided in Article XIII, Sec. 2
to reduce the value 25% on residential property for tax
purposes. For purposes of the adjustment, residential
property means any property used for residential purposes

as a primary residence. Property used for transient
residential use and condominiums used in rental pools
shall not qualify for the residential exemption. No more
than one acre of land per residential unit shall qualify
for the residential exemption. Land and the improvements
thereon must be separately assessed. School district
unmet need computations for critical school building aid
shall be determined as though the bonding capacity had not
been increased because of changes in the assessment rate.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103 (1938) provides:
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair
market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise
provided by law.
(2) The fair market value of residential property shall
be reduced by 25% representing a residential exemption
allowed under Article XIII, Sec. 2, Utah Constitution.
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit
may qualify for the residential exemption.
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986) [now codified
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201 and 59-2-301 (1988)] provides:
Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and
irrigation works, bridges and ferries, and the property of
car and transportation companies, when they are operated
as a unit in more than one county, all property of public
utilities whether operated within one county or more, all
mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous
mines based on ten times the annual net proceeds thereof
as provided in Section 59-5-57, and all other mines and
mining claims and other valuable deposits, including lands
containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals
underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person
other than the owner of such minerals, all machinery used
in mining and all property or surface improvements upon or
appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any
surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or
mining property for other than mining purposes; must be
assessed by the State Tax Commission as hereinafter
provided; except that property assessed by the unitary
method, not necessary to the conduct and which does not
contribute to the income of the business shall be assessed
separately. On January 1, 1986, all methods of assessment
used by the State Tax Commission not in statue shall be
changed so as to increase assessment values by a factor of

2

five. All taxable property not required by the
Constitution or by law to be assessed by the State Tax
Commission must be assessed by the county assessor of the
several counties in which the same is situated.
For the
purposes of taxation all mills, reduction works, and
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or
smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner
thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or
mining claim though the same is not upon such mine or
mining claim.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201

(1988) provides:

(1) By May 1 the following property shall be assessed by
the commission at 100% of fair market value, as valued on
January 1, in accordance with this chapter:
(a) all property which operates as a unit across
county lines, if the values must be apportioned among more
than one county or state;
(b) all property of public utilities;
(c) all mines and mining claims and other valuable
mineral deposits;
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or
mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of
mining claims or mining property for other than mining
purposes. For the purposes of assessment and taxation,
all processing plants, mills, reduction works, and
smelters which are primarily used by the owner of a mine
or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smelting
minerals taken from a mine or mining claim, shall be
considered appurtenant to that mine or mining claim,
regardless of actual location; and
(e) in all cases where the surface of lands is owned
by one person and the mineral underlying those lands is
owned by another, the property rights shall be separately
assessed to the respective owners. If the surface is used
for other than mining purposes, the value of the surface
shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in which
the property is located.
(2) The method for determining the fair market value of
productive mining property is the capitalized net revenue
method or any other valuation method the commission
believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair
market value of the mining property. The rate of
capitalization applicable to mines shall be determined by
the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return
expected by an investor in light of that industry's

3

current market, financial, and economic conditions- In no
event may the fair market value of the mining property be
less than the fair market value of the land, improvements,
and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the
mining property.
(3) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or
operator of the assessed property shall be notified of the
assessment. The assessor of the county in which the
property is located shall also be immediately notified of
the assessment,
(4) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not
necessary to the conduct and does not contribute to the
income of the business as determined by the commission,
shall be assessed separately by the local county assessor.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301 (1988) provides:
The county assessor shall assess all property located
within the county which is not required by law to be
assessed by the commission.
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (1986) [now
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1988)] provides:
(1) When the county assessor uses the comparable sales or
cost appraisal method in valuing taxable property for
assessment purposes, the assessor is required to recognize
that various fees, services, closing costs, and other
expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual
amount that may be received in the transaction. The
county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of the value
based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the
property as its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of
assessment.
(2) (a) Prior to January 1, 1987, the State Tax
Commission shall develop and implement comparable sales or
cost appraisal methods in valuing taxable property for
assessment purposes which provide that the various fees,
services, closing costs and other expenses related to the
sales transaction and other intangible values are not
included as part of the reasonable fair cash value for
purposes of assessment.
(b) Beginning January 1, 1987, the provisions of
Subsection (1) do not apply to county assessors using the
sales or cost appraisal method in valuing taxable property
for assessment purposes. For assessments beginning
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January 1, 1987, the State Tax Commission shall by
regulation order county assessors to use the comparable
sales or cost appraisal methods which are rehired to be
developed and implemented in Subsection (2)(- in place of
the requirement of Subsection (1).
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1988) provides:
(1) If the county assessor uses the comparable sales or
cost appraisal method in determining the fair market value
of taxable property for assessment purposes, the assessor
is required to recognize that various fees, services,
closing costs, and c:her expenses related to the
transaction lessen the actual amount that may be received
in the transaction. The county assessor shall, therefore,
take 80% of the value based on comparable sales or cost
appraisal of the property as its fair market value.
(2) (a) Prior to January 1, 1990, the commission shall
develop and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal
methods in valuing taxable property for assessment
purposes which provide that the various fees, services,
closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales
transaction and other intangible values are not included
as part of the fair market value for purposes of taxation.
(b) Beginning January 1, 1990, the provisions of
Subsection (1) do not apply. Beginning January 1, 1990,
the commission shall, by rule, order county assessors to
use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods which
are required to be developed and implemented in Subsection
(2)(a) in place of the requirement of Subsection (1).
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